# Introduction to NTRU Public Key Cryptosystem<sup>†</sup>

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# Outline

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Convolution Polynomial Rings
- 3. Multiplicative Inverse
- 4. NTRUEncrypt
- 5. Security
- 6. Performance
- 7. Conclusion

# NTRU

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 A public key cryptosystem [HPS98] invented in early 1996 by





# Hoffstein



Pipher

# **Ring of Convolution Polynomials**

# **Definition** The ring of convolution polynomials of rank $N^1$ is the quotient ring

$$R = \frac{\mathbb{Z}[x]}{\langle x^N - 1 \rangle}$$

<sup>1</sup>a.k.a. N-th truncated polynomial ring

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# **Definition** The ring of convolution polynomials modulo q of rank N is the quotient ring

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 or  $\mathbf{a} = (a_0, \dots, a_{N-1})$ 

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with the coefficients in  $\mathbb{Z}$ . • For every term  $x^k$ , if  $k = r \mod N$ , then

$$x^{k} = x^{r}.$$
$$x^{N} = 1, x^{N+1} = x, ..$$

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 $x^{k} = x^{r}.$  $x^{N} = 1, x^{N+1} = x, \dots$ 

• Polynomials in  $R_a$  can also be uniquely identified in the same way.

# **Operations of Convolution Polynomial Rings**

Every ring has two operations, i.e, addition and multiplication.
Addition of polynomials correspond to the usual addition of vectors,

 $a(x) + b(x) \leftrightarrow \overline{(a_0 + b_0, a_1 + b_1, a_2 + b_2, \dots, a_{N-1} + b_{N-1})}.$ 

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• **Multiply** two polynomials mod  $x^N - 1$ , i.e., replace  $x^k$  with  $x^{k \mod N}$ .

$$\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{a} \star \mathbf{b}, \quad c_i = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} a_j b_{i-j}$$

2. Convolution Polynomial Rings

Example

Let 
$$N = 3$$
 and  $a(x) = 1 + 3x + x^2$ , and  $b(x) = -4 + x + 2x^2$ . Then  
 $a(x) + b(x) = (1 - 4) + (3 + 1)x + (1 + 2)x^2 = -3 + 4x + 3x^2$   
 $a(x) \star b(x) = -4 - 11x + x^2 + 7x^3 + 2x^4$   
 $= -4 - 11x + x^2 + 7 + 2x$   
 $= 3 - 9x + x^2 \in R = \frac{\mathbb{Z}[x]}{\langle x^3 - 1 \rangle}$   
 $= 3 + 5x + x^2 \in R_7 = \frac{\mathbb{Z}_7[x]}{\langle x^3 - 1 \rangle}.$ 

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 $\mathbf{a} \star \mathbf{b} = [a_0 \ a_1 \ a_2] \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \ b_1 \ b_2 \\ b_2 \ b_0 \ b_1 \\ b_1 \ b_2 \ b_0 \end{bmatrix} = [1 \ 3 \ 1] \begin{bmatrix} -4 \ 1 \ 2 \\ 2 \ -4 \ 1 \\ 1 \ 2 \ -4 \end{bmatrix}$   
 $= [3 \ -9 \ 1]$ 

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 $\mathbf{a} \star \mathbf{b} = [a_0 \ a_1 \ a_2] \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \ b_1 \ b_2 \\ b_2 \ b_0 \ b_1 \\ b_1 \ b_2 \ b_0 \end{bmatrix} = [1 \ 3 \ 1] \begin{bmatrix} -4 \ 1 \ 2 \\ 2 \ -4 \ 1 \\ 1 \ 2 \ -4 \end{bmatrix}$   
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A polynomial multiplication takes  $N^2$  multiplications.

# Convolution Polynomial Rings in Sage I

• Generate 
$$R = \frac{\mathbb{Z}[x]}{\langle x^7 - 1 \rangle}$$

N = 7
ZX.<X> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
R.<x> = ZX.quotient(X^N - 1); R
Univariate Quotient Polynomial Ring in x over
Integer Ring with modulus X^7 - 1

• Generate 
$$R_3 = \frac{\mathbb{Z}_3[x]}{\langle x^7 - 1 \rangle}$$

N, q = 7, 3
ZqX.<X> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(q))
Rq.<x> = ZqX.quotient(X^N - 1); Rq
Univariate Quotient Polynomial Ring in x over
Ring of integers modulo 3 with modulus X^7 + 2

2. Convolution Polynomial Rings

# **Convolution Polynomial Rings in Sage II**

• Choose two elements at random from *R*, and multiply them: [f, g] = [Rq.random\_element() for \_ in range(2)] print("(f, g) = ", (f, g)) print("f\*g = ", f\*g) (f, g) = (2\*x^6 + 2\*x^4 + x^3, 2\*x^6 + x^2 + 2\*x) f\*g = 2\*x^6 + 2\*x^4 + x^3 + 2\*x^2 + 2\*x + 1

• Lift  $f \in R_3 = \frac{\mathbb{Z}_3[X]}{(X^7 - 1)}$  into  $\mathbb{Z}_3[X]$ 

print(f.parent())
Univariate Quotient Polynomial Ring in x over
Ring of integers modulo 3 with modulus X<sup>7</sup> + 2

```
f = f.lift()
print(f.parent())
Univariate Polynomial Ring in X over
Ring of integers modulo 3
```

### Multiplicative Inverse I

 $f(x) \in \mathbf{R}_{a}$  has a multiplicative inverse if and only if

$$gcd(f(x), x^N - 1) = 1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x].$$

If so, then the inverse  $f(x)^{-1} \in R_q$  can be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm to find polynomials  $u(x), v(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$  satisfying

$$f(x) \star u(x) + (x^N - 1) \star v(x) = 1$$

Then  $f^{-1}(x) = u(x) \in R_q$ .

#### Multiplicative Inverse II

You can simply compute the inverse via SageMath[The21] (if it exists!)

```
reset()
N, q = 7, 4
Zx.<X> = ZZ[]
f = X^6 - X^4 + X^3 + X^2 -1
Zq.<a> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(q))
f = Zq(f) # Moving f from Zx[x] into Zq[a]
print("gcd(f, a^N - 1) = ", f.gcd(a^N - 1))
f_inv = f.inverse_mod(a^N - 1); f_inv(a=X)
```

```
gcd(f, a^N - 1) = 1
X^5 + 3*X^4 + 3*X^3 + 2*X^2
```

• Check to see if the multiplication of  $f \star f^{-1} = 1 \mod q$ ?  $Zq(f*f_inv).mod(a^N - 1)$ 

# Parameters: N, p, q, (p, q) = 1. E.g., N = 401, p = 3, q = 2048



Parameters: N, p, q, (p, q) = 1. E.g., N = 401, p = 3, q = 2048Definition (Centered modular reduction) For an odd integer n and integers a and b, define

 $a \mod n = b$  if  $a \equiv b \mod n$  and  $-\frac{n-1}{2} \le b \le \frac{n}{2}$ .

For example  $a \mod 5 \in \{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2\}$ , whereas  $a \mod 5 \in \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\}$ .

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- Choose  $F(x), G(x) \in R$  s.t.  $\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{G} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^N$ .
- f(x) = 1 + pF(x), compute  $f^{-1}(x)$
- $\blacktriangleright \quad \overline{g(x)} = p\overline{G(x)}$
- Compute  $h(x) = f^{-1}(x) \star g(x) \mod q$

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### • Enc:

- Plaintext  $\mathbf{m} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^N$
- Choose  $\mathbf{r} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^N$  uniformly at random
- $\blacktriangleright$  Ciphertext  $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{m} \mod q$

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#### • Dec:



Compute  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{v} \mod q$ Compute  $\mathbf{m'} = \mathbf{a} \mod p$ 

• Dec:

Compute  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{y} \mod q$   $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod q$   $(\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{m} \mod q)$  $= \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod q$   $(\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} \mod q)$ 

 $\equiv \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod q$ 

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Compute  $\mathbf{m'} = \mathbf{a} \mod p$ If the coefficients of  $\mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m}$  lie in the interval

$$\left[-\frac{q-1}{2},\frac{q}{2}\right]$$

which holds with high probability. In such cases,

 $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{y} \mod q = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m}$ 

 $\mathbf{m'} = (\mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{y} \mod q) \mod p = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod p$ 

 $\equiv$  **m** mod *p*. (**g** = **pG**, **f** = **1** + **pF**)

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Compute  $\mathbf{m'} = \mathbf{a} \mod p$ If the coefficients of  $\mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m}$  lie in the interval

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which holds with high probability. In such cases,

 $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{y} \mod q = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m}$ 

 $\mathbf{m'} = (\mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{y} \mod q) \mod \overline{p = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod p}$ 

 $\equiv$  **m** mod *p*. (**g** = **pG**, **f** = **1** + **pF**)

Therefore,  $\mathbf{m}' = \mathbf{m} =$ . The ciphertext is decrypted correctly.

If an attacker decrypts y with a f' where  $f' \neq f$ , can she/he recover the plaintext polynomial m?

# Decrypt with f'

### Decrypt with f'

• Dec:

Compute  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{y} \mod q$ 

 $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{m} \mod q \quad (\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{m} \mod q)$  $= \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{m} \mod q \quad (\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} \mod q)$  $\equiv \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod q$ 

#### Decrypt with f'

• Dec:

Compute  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{y} \mod q$ 

 $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{m} \mod q \quad (\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{m} \mod q)$  $= \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{m} \mod q \quad (\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} \mod q)$  $\equiv \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod q$ 

Compute  $\mathbf{m'} = \mathbf{a} \mod p$ If the following equation holds, the attacker can recover  $\mathbf{m}$ .  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f'} \star \mathbf{y} \mod q = \mathbf{f''} \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f'} \star \mathbf{m}$ where  $\mathbf{f''} = \mathbf{f'} \star \mathbf{f^{-1}} \mod q$  Recall  $\mathbf{g} = \mathbf{pG}, \mathbf{f} = \mathbf{1} + \mathbf{pF}$   $\mathbf{f'} \star \mathbf{m}$  and  $\mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g}$  still have small coefficients, whereas  $\mathbf{f''} \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g}$  is likely to have large coefficients.

#### Example I

Suppose N = 11, p = 3 and q = 23. Key-Generation:

- Choose  $F(x), G(x) \in \mathbb{R}$  s.t. F,  $G \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^N$ .  $F(x) = x^{10} - x^9 + x^8 - x^4 - x^2 + x$   $f(x) = 3x^{10} - 3x^9 + 3x^8 - 3x^4 - 3x^2 + 3x + 1 \leftarrow f(x) = 1 + pF(x)$   $f^{-1}(x) = -11x^{10} + 7x^9 - 8x^8 + 2x^7 + 6x^6 - x^5 - 2x^4 - 3x^3 - 3x^2 - 11x + 2$   $G(x) = x^9 - x^8 - x^7 + x^6 + x^4 - 1$ ,  $g(x) = 3x^9 - 3x^8 - 3x^7 + 3x^6 + 3x^4 - 3 \leftarrow g(x) = pG(x)$
- Compute  $h(x) = f^{-1}(x) \star g(x) \mod q$  $h(x) = 7x^{10} - 8x^9 + 3x^8 - 10x^6 - 8x^5 - 6x^3 - 8x^2 + 4x + 3$
- PK: h(x), SK: f(x)

0 0

# Example II

### Enc:

- Plaintext  $\mathbf{m} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^N$  $m(x) = x^{10} - x^5 + x^3 - 1$
- Choose  $\mathbf{r} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^N$  uniformly at random  $r(x) = x^9 + x^7 x^6 x^5 x^4 + x^2$ .
- Ciphertext  $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{h} + \mathbf{m} \mod q$  $y(x) = -3x^{10} + 9x^9 + -8x^8 - 3x^7 + 11x^6 - 6x^5 + 6x^4 - 5x^3 - 2x^2 + 1$

#### Example III

#### Dec:

• Compute  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{y} \mod q = \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} \mod q$   $\mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{y} = 12x^{10} - 29x^8 + 3x^7 + 23x^6 + 45x^5 - 66x^4 + 67x^3 - 83x^2 + 63x - 35 \in \mathbb{R}$  $a(x) = -11x^{10} - 6x^8 + 3x^7 - x^5 + 3x^4 - 2x^3 + 9x^2 - 6x + 11 \in \mathbb{R}_q$ 

Compute m' = a mod p
 Coefficients of a(x) all lie in the interval [-11, 11]. Applying mod 3 we have

$$m'(x) = x^{10} - x^5 + x^3 - 1 = m(x)$$

Check

 $\mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{m} = -11x^{10} - 6x^8 + 3x^7 - x^5 + 3x^4 - 2x^3 + 9x^2 - 6x + 11 \in \mathbb{R}$ 

#### Example IV

Dec with incorect secret key  $f' = 1 + 3(x^9 - x^8 - x^6 - x^5 + x^3 + 1)$ 

- Compute  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{y} \mod q = \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{m} \mod q$  $a(x) = 8x^{10} + 5x^8 + 2x^7 - 2x^6 - 9x^5 + 2x^4 - 2x^3 + 6x^2 - 7x - 3 \in R_q$
- Compute  $\mathbf{m}' = \mathbf{a} \mod p$  $m'(x) = -x^{10} - x^8 - x^7 + x^6 - x^4 + x^3 - x \neq m(x).$
- Check

 $\mathbf{f}'' = \mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{f}^{-1} \mod q = -7x^{10} - 9x^9 + 4x^8 - 4x^7 + 6x^6 - 7x^5 - 3x^4 + 3x^3 + 2x^2 - 11x + 4 \in R_q$   $\mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{m} = 7x^{10} - 6x^9 - 3x^7 + 6x^6 - 4x^5 - 3x^4 - 2x^3 + 6x^2 + 3x - 4 \in R$   $\mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} = -9x^{10} - 9x^9 + 3x^6 + 3x^5 - 3x^3 + 6x^2 + 3x + 6$   $\mathbf{f}' \star \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g} = 24x^{10} + 213x^9 - 87x^8 - 18x^7 + 15x^6 - 51x^5 + 51x^4 - 69x^3 - 138x^2 - 33x + 93$  $\mathbf{f}'' \star \mathbf{r} \star \mathbf{g}$  has large coefficients compared to q/2.

0 0 0

# Conditions for parameters

• Each of  $\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{m}$  have (roughly)  $\frac{1}{3}$  of their coefficients equal to each of -1, 0 and 1.

Related to the security of the scheme.

• q should be large compared to N.

To ensure the decryption is correct with high probability.

### Lattice reduction

Same problem that breaks the knapsack!

 $\circ\,$  If attacker can determine  $f^{-1}$  or g, from h, she gets the private key.

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• If attacker can determine  $f^{-1}$  or g, from h, she gets the private key.

The NTRU Key Recovery Problem[HPSS08] Given h(x), find ternary polynomials f(x) and g(x) satisfying  $f(x) \star h(x) = g(x) \mod q$  where coefficients of f(x) and g(x) lie in  $\{-p, 0, p\}$ .

0 0

What is the hard math problem behind NTRU?  $\circ$  Recall  $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} \mod q$ 

- Recall  $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} \mod q$
- Equivalently,  $\mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{h} \equiv \mathbf{g} \mod q$ . I.e., there exists some integer vector  $\mathbf{t}$  such that

$$\mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{h} - \mathbf{g} = q\mathbf{t}$$

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#### • Let

$$\mathbf{H} = \begin{pmatrix} h_0 & h_{N-1} & h_{N-2} & \cdots & h_1 \\ h_1 & h_0 & h_{N-1} & \cdots & h_2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & & \vdots \\ h_{N-1} & h_{N-2} & h_{N-3} & \cdots & h_0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{M} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{I}_{N \times N} & \mathbf{H}_{N \times N} \\ \mathbf{0}_{N \times N} & q \mathbf{I}_{N \times N} \end{pmatrix}$$
  
So  $(\mathbf{f}, -\mathbf{t})\mathbf{M} = (\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g}).$ 

- Recall  $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{f}^{-1} \star \mathbf{g} \mod q$
- Equivalently,  $\mathbf{f} \star \mathbf{h} \equiv \mathbf{g} \mod q$ . I.e., there exists some integer vector  $\mathbf{t}$  such that

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 $\mathbf{H} = \begin{pmatrix} h_0 & h_{N-1} & h_{N-2} & \cdots & h_1 \\ h_1 & h_0 & h_{N-1} & \cdots & h_2 \\ \vdots & \ddots & & \vdots \\ h_{N-1} & h_{N-2} & h_{N-3} & \cdots & h_0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{M} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{I}_{N \times N} & \mathbf{H}_{N \times N} \\ \mathbf{0}_{N \times N} & q \mathbf{I}_{N \times N} \end{pmatrix}$ So  $(\mathbf{f}, -\mathbf{t})\mathbf{M} = (\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g}).$  $\circ$  Let  $\mathcal{L}$  be the lattice spanned by column vectors of  $\mathbf{M}$ .

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• It seems that  $(\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g})$  is the shortest vector in the lattice  $\mathcal{L}$ .

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# NTRU and SVP

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- There is no proof that breaking NTRUEncrypt is as hard as solving the Shortest Vector Problem or the Closest Vector Problem.
- In 2013, Damien Stehle and Ron Steinfeld created a provably secure version of NTRU [SS13].
- The European Union's PQCRYPTO project (Horizon 2020 ICT-645622) is evaluating the provably secure Stehle–Steinfeld version of NTRU as a potential European standard. However, the Stehle-Steinfeld version of NTRU is "significantly less efficient than the original scheme."

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- Faster than RSA at equivalent cryptographic strength.
- Promising PQC candidate

The National Institute of Standards and Technology wrote in a 2009 survey that "[there] are viable alternatives for both public key encryption and signatures that are not vulnerable to Shor's Algorithm" and "[of] the various lattice based cryptographic schemes that have been developed, the NTRU family of cryptographic algorithms appears to be the most practical".

### Conclusion

- A lattice-based public key cryptosystem
- Its security relies on difficulty of SVP problem
- Has evolved since its introduction
- Considered theoretically sound
- Unlike RSA and ECC, NTRU is not known to be vulnerable against quantum computer based attack
- It has been standardized (IEEE Std 1363.1, X9.98)

# Thanks for your attention!

Question?



### **References** I

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